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“EXCESS” PAIN, HYPERALGESIA, 
AND THE VARIABILITY OF 
SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE 
 
AMANDA PUSTILNIK, DAVE SEMINOWICZ, AND STEPHEN RIGG 
 
SPEAKERS: JOEL GREENSPAN,* JUDGE MORRIS HOFFMAN,** ADAM 
KOLBER,*** AND MICHAEL PARDO**** 
 
Pain is everywhere: It’s the most salient and, in many ways, the 
most difficult of the legally salient emotions. 
Judge Morris Hoffman 
 
I.     INTRODUCTION 
 
The second panel of the conference, focusing on “excess pain,” 
addressed issues relating to scientific findings of the individual variability 
of pain experience and pain perception, which is in contrast to the legal 
presumption that there is a specific amount of pain that ought to be typical 
for particular conditions.1 The panel represented a great breadth of 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Amanda Pustilnik.  
* Professor & Chair, Dep’t of Neural & Pain Sci., Univ. of Md. Sch. of Dentistry; Dep’t of 
Neurosurgery, Johns Hopkins Sch. of Med.; Founder & Dir., Univ. of Md. Research Ctr. for 
Neuroendocrine Influences on Pain. See Joel D. Greenspan, PhD, U. MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY 
SCH. LAW, 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/conferences/conf166/speakers/Joel_D_Greenspan.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2015).  
** Denver Dist. Ct.; Adjunct Professor, Univ. of Colo. at Boulder; Member, MacArthur Found. 
Research Network on Law & Neuroscience. See The Honorable Morris Hoffman, U. MD. 
FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. LAW, 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/conferences/conf166/speakers/Honorable_Morris_Hoffma
n.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); Morris B. Hoffman – 2nd Judicial District Court Judge, COLO. 
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Bio.cfm?Employee_ID=558 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2015). 
***Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch.; Founder, Neuroethics & Law Blog. See Prof. Adam 
Kolber, Curriculum Vitae, BROOK. L. SCH. (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.brooklaw.edu/cvs/adam_kolber.pdf. 
  
238 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 18:237 
experience, consisting of a pain researcher, a sitting judge, a legal scholar in 
the field of evidence law, and a legal scholar in the field of law and 
neuroscience.2  
Professor Joel D. Greenspan, PhD spoke first about the variability of 
individual pain experience. He described the range of individual pain 
variation, and some of the genetic and neuroendocrine influences thereon.3 
For the benefit of the attorneys and other non-scientists in attendance, he 
provided a brief seminar on how pain is perceived, how pain becomes 
chronic, and how clinicians measure and assess pain.4 This provided a 
sound foundation for discussions later in the panel that related to the 
perception and detection of chronic pain.5 
The Honorable Morris Hoffman,6 a frequent commentator on law and 
neuroscience and a founding member of the MacArthur Law & 
Neuroscience Project, spoke on the ways in which legal doctrines and legal 
actors struggle with issues relating to pain.7 He introduced several key 
themes: the variability of pain itself combined with the variability that 
decision makers (like judges and jurors) have in being able to understand 
the pain of others; the composite nature of pain as both a physical 
phenomenon and a narrative experience that has meaning within the context 
of an individual’s life; and the difficulties of “ mind-reading,” which are 
 
**** Professor of Law, Univ. of Ala.; Former Chair, Am. Ass’n of Law Schs. Section on 
Evidence. See Michael S. Pardo, Curriculum Vitae, U. ALA. SCH. LAW, 
http://www.law.ua.edu/directory/files/cv/Pardo-Michael%20S.-cv.pdf (last revised Feb. 1, 2015). 
 1. Joel Greenspan, Adam Kolber, & Michael Pardo, Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: 
Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 2: “Excess Pain,” Hyperalgisia, and 
the Variability of Subjective Experience (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 2] (transcript on file 
with the editors).  
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 3–4. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See generally Jennifer Chandler, Robert Dinerstein, Jennifer A. Haythornthwaite, Tor D. 
Wagner, Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law 
Symposium, Panel 3: Chronic Pain, “Psychogenic” Pain, and Emotion (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter 
Panel 3] (transcript on file with the editors) (expanding on issues that distinguish among organic, 
social, emotional, physical, real, and imagined kinds of pain in both the research and legal 
context). 
 6. Denver Dist. Ct.; Adjunct Professor, Univ. of Colo. at Boulder; Member, MacArthur 
Found. Research Network on Law & Neuroscience. See The Honorable Morris Hoffman, U. MD. 
FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. LAW, 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/conferences/conf166/speakers/Honorable_Morris_Hoffma
n.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2014); Morris B. Hoffman – 2nd Judicial District Court Judge, COLO. 
JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.co.us/Bio.cfm?Employee_ID=558 (last visited Mar. 15, 
2015).  
 7. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 9–10 (attributing the difficulties in dealing with pain in the law to 
three sources: the enormous variability of pain, that memory and pain are conflated, and that the 
law fails to emphasize certain kinds of pain). 
Panel 2 Final.docx  
2015] PANEL 2 239 
present in relation to many legal determinations, but which may be 
particularly acute in relation to pain and suffering.8  
Professor Michael Pardo, a professor of evidence law who has 
published widely in the areas of law and neuroscience and who is a 
philosophy of law, offered his views on the considerations involved in 
whether to admit neuroscience based evidence of chronic pain. He first 
offered legal and theoretical considerations that pertain to scientific 
evidence in general, and then provided specific insights relating to the 
neuroscience based evidence of pain.9 He framed his remarks by noting that 
while he would address the law of evidence specifically, including factors 
like the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert test for expert evidence, 
the issues in evidence law go beyond the Rules.10 Further, he contended 
that it is necessary to evaluate the normative goals of the legal system in 
relation to its institutional competencies and the ways in which legal actors 
and lay people engage in decision making as we consider how scientific 
evidence may or may not enhance the legal process.11 
Professor Adam Kolber noted that pain neuroimaging might cause the 
law to consider subjective differences in perception in a range of areas.12 
Beyond disability and tort, he suggested that the law might need to consider 
subjective differences in the experience of punishment in criminal law.13 
He also discussed problems with conventional pain rating scales, suggesting 
ways that the use of pain neuroimaging could supplement these traditional 
measures.14 
Overall, the panel described how chronic pain diseases disturb healthy, 
typical pain processing in ways that involve the peripheral nervous system 
and the brain, making legal expectations about typical or expected degrees 
of pain misguided in the context of chronic pain disorders.15 Neuroimaging 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 18–19 (describing the difficulties in ascertaining the goals of expert testimony as 
well as the difficulties with evidence regulation policies). 
 10. Id. at 19–20 (explaining the arguments for and against both strict and lax evidence policy 
regulation); see also Michael Finch, Law and the Problem of Pain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. (2011) 
(highlighting the difficulties in relying on subjective chronic pain evidence of fibromyalgia in the 
absence of objective evidence availability). 
 11. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 18–20. 
 12. Id. at 6–8; see generally Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY 
L.J. 585, 588 (2011) (discussing the ability to assess subjective pain perceptions in (1) a patient in 
a persistent vegetative state, (2) a subject receiving a placebo treatment relieving pain, (3) an 
alleged victim of child abuse, (4) an inmate undergoing an execution, and (5) an interrogation 
allegedly consisting of torture). 
 13. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 6–7; see also Alison K. Bennett & Jason Bloom, Neurolaw Brain 
Waves in the Courtroom, 75 TEX. B.J. 280 (2012) (discussing the implications for juror decision 
making in criminal law in light of recent neuroimaging technology). 
 14. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 6, 8. 
 15. Id. 
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shows that people’s self reports about how much pain they feel matches the 
degree of brain activation in key pain regions.16 This provides proof of a 
foundational concept: subjective self reports match brain activity or, in 
other words, phenomenology correlates with physiology.17 Put more 
simply: when people complain of different degrees of pain in response to 
the same stimulus, they are reporting on real variation—it is not merely that 
they have different styles of self expression.18  
The panelists agreed that evidence of individual pain intensity is not 
yet available through neuroimaging, particularly for chronic pain.19 Yet, 
neuroscientific evidence about pain variability is available, which provides 
a framework; neuroscientific evidence could potentially be used to inform a 
range of people from decision makers to lawmakers to jurors about how 
chronic pain arises and how it affects those who suffer from it. 
Panelists emphasized that accepting the notion that there may be no 
such thing as typical pain does not mean that the legal system needs to take 
all pain claims at face value.20 There are various ways of testing and 
corroborating how much pain a person is experiencing.21 Accepting that 
there is no such thing as a typical or reasonable amount of pain does mean 
that legal decision makers should start from different baseline expectations. 
The expectation should be that the decision maker has to make a factual 
finding about how much pain this claimant is experiencing in light of all the 
evidence—not merely to make a relative finding about whether this 








 16. Robert C. Coghill, Individual Differences in the Subjective Experience of Pain: New 
Insights into Mechanisms and Models 2 (Oct. 1, 2011) (subsequently published) (on file with 
NIH), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2959190/pdf/nihms231860.pdf. 
These tests were completed in a laboratory setting where the subjects have no incentive to 
fabricate. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 8, 13–14, 18. 
 20. Id. at 11–12. See also Jerel C. Dawson, The Conundrum of Self-Reported Symptoms, LIFE, 
HEALTH & DISABILITY, Sept. 2008, at 70, 71 (explaining that in ERISA claims, the administrator 
must consider the possibility that applicants are exaggerating). 
 21. See Robert J. Gatchel et al., The Biopsychosocial Approach to Chronic Pain: Scientific 
Advances and Future Directions, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 581, 585 (2007) (describing different 
techniques for visually identifying inflammatory pain). 
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II.      PAIN EXPERIENCE AND DETECTION: PAIN IS HIGHLY VARIABLE, 
AND “REASONABLE” PAIN IS NOT CLINICALLY MEANINGFUL 
 
A.      Pain Is Highly Variable: Pain Levels and “Excess” Pain 
 
Professor Greenspan addressed the question of levels of pain, and was 
joined in discussion by conference participants Professors Karen Davis and 
Jennifer Haythornthwaite.22 They described a range of influences on 
patients’ experience of pain, including medical, genetic, phenotypic, and 
social-psychological factors.23 The panel involved a discussion of kinds (or 
categories) of chronic pain and pain experience that can involve unusual or 
amplified pain sensation, including the conditions of hyperalgesia and 
allodynia.24 Professor Greenspan and other participants also discussed 
common pain evaluation techniques.25 The conclusion of the discussion 
amongst these pain researchers is that the common legal designation of 
“excess” or “unreasonable” pain is not clinically meaningful, and tends to 
be misleading.26 This section of the panel sought to explain mechanisms for 
normal and abnormal pain processing and the tools used to quantify pain 
perception.27 
Professor Greenspan first discussed the broad range of normal 
responses to a painful stimulation.28 He then addressed the question of how 
to evaluate whether a patient has unusual or “excess” pain in relation to the 
difficulty of establishing a “typical” or “normal” pain baseline.29 Professor 
Greenspan remarked that in order “to decide what’s excess pain or what is 
hyperalgesic pain, you have to kind of know where [the] cutoff[s] [are at 
each end for unusually low or high sensitivity], and that’s not easy to do.” 
The big problem becomes deciding what is more than standard pain.30 He 
noted that there would be a very wide range of responses in any study that 
would apply a painful stimulus to people without a pain problem.31 
Accordingly, “clinically speaking . . . [it is difficult to decide] if someone 
 
 22. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 3–4. Professor Greenspan’s original comments have been 
augmented here beyond the constraints of what the one hour panel permitted. 
 23. See, e.g., id. at 18 (explaining that contributions to pain variability include differences in 
the type of injury, existence of mental coping mechanisms, and varying behavioral repertoire). 
 24. Id. at 3–5. 
 25. Id. at 1–5, 14, 22, 24. 
 26. Id. at 8. 
 27. See generally id.  
 28. Id. at 3–4 (noting that in a sample group, people will interpret pain at different levels, 
which suggests a wide range of sensitivity). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 14. 
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has an abnormal pain sensitivity.”32 Because the range of normal sensitivity 
is so broad, most researchers and clinicians believe that defining abnormal 
sensitivity as being totally outside a range of normal sensitivity is too 
stringent a criterion.33 
Professor Greenspan noted that clinicians develop a sense (through 
experience) of how a range of patients with conditions like lower back pain 
might respond to evoked pain in cases where the clinician applies some 
kind of stimulation to the patient.34 Based on clinicians’ experience of how 
a broad sample of patients has reacted, clinicians can characterize if a 
patient has abnormal sensitivity.35 This observation by Professor Greenspan 
introduced what would become a theme of the panel: the idea of dual 
variability.36 Patients vary both in their sensitivity to pain and in the ways 
that they report pain.37 Additionally, clinicians, who have differing kinds 
and levels of experience as well as differing normative commitments 
concerning pain might also vary in their interpretation of a patient’s report 
of pain.38 Thus, one clinician might find a patient’s report to be within the 
range of normal sensitivity while another clinician might determine that the 
same patient is abnormally sensitive. 
Professor Greenspan remarked that “the basic question” for clinicians, 
and often for legal actors, is determining “what is ‘excess pain’ and how . . . 
this relate[s] to the question of what is ‘hyperalgesia’”—a specific form of 
unusual pain sensitivity.39 Hyperalgesia is a clinical term that describes an 
 
 32. Id. at 4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. This form of testing is appropriate to some forms of chronic pain, like lower back pain or 
arthritic pain, but not to others, including chronic headache or irritable bowel syndrome. Id. at 3–
5; see also David A. Seminowicz et al., Effective Treatment of Chronic Low Back Pain in Humans 
Reverses Abnormal Brain Anatomy and Function, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7540, 7541 (2011) (noting 
a study that recruited low back pain patients for pain evaluation through stimulation); David A. 
Seminowicz et al., Regional Gray Matter Density Changes Brain Patient with Irritable Bowel 
Syndrome, 139 GASTROENTEROLOGY 47, 54–55 (2010) (noting a study that analyzed irritable 
bowel syndrome patients’ responses to pain stimulation); Clifford J. Woolf, Central Sensitization: 
Implications for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Pain, 152 J. PAIN S2, S7–S9 (2011) (discussing 
pain sensitization in patients with rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis, headaches, and irritable 
bowel syndrome). 
 35. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 3–5. 
 36. Id. at 4–5. 
 37. See, e.g., William Maixner et al., Orofacial Pain Prospective Evaluation and Risk 
Assessment Study – The OPPERA Study, 11 J. PAIN T4, T4–T6 (2011) (discussing factors that 
influence pain sensitivity and how these factors affect patients). 
 38. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 5–6; see also Keith Smart & Catherine Doody, The Clinical 
Reasoning of Pain by Experienced Musculoskeletal Physiotherapists, 12 MANUAL THERAPY 40, 
48 (2007) (noting that future research may address varying levels of experience in relation to 
clinical reasoning of pain). 
 39. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 3. 
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increased or heightened response to some painful stimulus.40 It is present 
when a patient is tested with some painful stimulus, which causes the 
patient more pain than typically expected.41 Pain amplification of this kind 
can occur through several well studied mechanisms.42 Pain amplification 
can occur “peripherally” (i.e., locally—at the site of the painful stimulation) 
because the nerves in that location have become sensitized.43 For example, 
lightly rubbing the skin with rough sandpaper ordinarily might be 
moderately painful. Applying the same stimulus to skin that has been 
sensitized with a burning capsaicin based cream would result in 
significantly more pain (i.e., locally induced hyperalgesia).44 Pain 
amplification can also occur in the spinal cord.45 This occurs when there is 
a heightened transmission of the pain signal from the peripheral pain 
sensing nerves to the dorsal horn of the spinal cord, which then sends the 
signal up to the brain, resulting in a kind of a megaphone effect.46 Finally, 
pain sensing and transmission can be unaltered both locally and in the 
spinal cord, but it then can be amplified in certain regions of the brain, such 
as in the thalamus following a stroke.47 These three paths to hyperalgesia 
can exist independently or in combination.48  
Determining whether a patient is unusually sensitive in response to a 
specific, painful stimulus is challenging.49 Yet, making such a 
determination becomes much more challenging to determine abnormal 
 
 40. Id.; see also IASP Taxonomy, INT’L ASSOC. FOR STUDY PAIN, http://www.iasp-
pain.org/Taxonomy (last updated May 22, 2012) (defining hyperalgesia as “diminished pain in 
response to a normally painful stimulus,” which is distinguishable from allodynia, which is “pain 
due to a stimulus that does not normally provoke pain”). 
 41. See sources cited supra note 40. 
 42. See Clifford J. Woolf & Michael Salter, Neural Plasticity: Increasing the Gain in Pain, 
288 SCIENCE MAGAZINE 1765, 1766 (2000) (describing peripheral terminals of nociceptors with 
activation of nociceptive transducer receptor/ion channel complexes, activity dependent plasticity, 
tissue damage/inflammation, and neuropathic pain by nervous system lesions as mechanisms 
contributing to pain); Smart & Doody, supra note 38, at 41 (noting that five categories of pain 
mechanisms include: (1) nociceptive; (2) peripheral neurogenic; (3) central pain; (4) autonomic 
and motor mechanisms; and (5) affective mechanisms). 
 43. See Woolf & Salter, supra note 42 (noting that physiological pain occurs at the 
“peripheral[] terminals of nociceptors”). 
 44. Jaquette Liljencrantz et al., Altered C-Tactile Processing in Human Dynamic Tactile 
Allodynia, 154 J. PAIN 227, 228 (2013) (discussing a study in which participants had capsaicin 
cream applied to their skin in order to analyze hyperalgesia and allodynia). 
 45. Woolf, supra note 34, at S3 (noting that pain hypersensitivity in patients occur and can be 
produced in the spinal cord). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at S3, S8. 
 48. See Woolf & Salter, supra note 42, at 1765 (noting that pain comprises three categories: 
physiological, inflammatory, and neuropathic pain). 
 49. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4 (finding difficulty in determining whether a person has 
abnormal pain sensitivity). 
  
244 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 18:237 
sensitivity in relation to non-evoked pain—that is, ongoing or chronic pain, 
which may exist independently of any particular stimulation.50 He noted 
that, “in the context of not being able to provoke the pain . . . [but rather in 
dealing] with a person’s ongoing pain . . . we have even less of a sense of 
how accurately they’re reporting what they’re feeling and how their use of 
the numbers [to rate the intensity of pain might] reflect[] a larger 
population’s use of numbers” for the same injury or disorder.51 
Accordingly, in both clinical and research settings, Professor Greenspan 
noted that “we typically try . . . a variety of different approaches to get at an 
assessment of pain sensitivity and look for concurrence of reporting, doing 
testing multiple times, or doing different types of testing, where you would 
expect a consistent picture to come if the person is consistently reporting 
what they’re saying they’re feeling.”52 
In addition to hyperalgesia, patients suffering from chronic pain 
frequently experience spontaneous pain.53 It is most clearly exemplified in 
the case of central pain, where a lesion to the spinal cord or brain is present, 
but spontaneous pain is often reported in many chronic pain conditions.54 
The pain is usually localized to an area of the body, despite there being no 
evident injury or activation of peripheral nerves from that body part.55 
Spontaneous pain appears to happen in the absence of an external 
stimulus.56 It is unclear whether the pain is actually spontaneous or whether 
it is evoked by abnormalities whose nature or cause is not determinable by 
using current techniques.57 Regardless of its cause, spontaneous pain is 
often the most debilitating and frustrating symptom for patients.58 Since 
 
 50. Id. at 5. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See generally Gary J. Bennett, What is Spontaneous Pain and Who Has It?, 13 J. PAIN 
921, 927 (2012) (distinguishing chronic pain, spontaneous pain, and pain from temporally 
summated hypersensitivity); Jeffrey S. Mogil, The Etiology and Symptomatology of Spontaneous 
Pain, 13 J. PAIN 932, 932 (2012) (suggesting that “spontaneous” should be understood as a way of 
characterizing the symptomatology rather than the etiology of pain); John D. Loeser, Chronic 
Pain is More Than a Peripheral Event, 13 J. PAIN 930, 930–31 (2012) (noting that the term 
“spontaneous” is misleading because there is always a physiological process that underlies the 
report of pain). 
 54. Bennett, supra note 53, at 923, 924, 926. 
 55. See generally Loeser, supra note 53, at 930 (“It is not relevant that we sometimes cannot 
find the site at which the nociception originates or determine a proximate stimulus.”). 
 56. See generally Bennett, supra note 53, at 922 (asserting that spontaneous pain is the result 
of neuronal changes in the somatosensory system). 
 57. See Mogil, supra note 53, at 932–33 (questioning clinical failures to elicit neuropathic 
pain patients’ hypersensitivity state in laboratory settings). 
 58. See e.g., Andrew Davies et al., Breakthrough Cancer Pain: An Observational Study of 
1000 European Oncology Patients, 43 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MANAGEMENT 619, 626–27 (2013) 
(asserting that spontaneous pain in cancer patients is a significant cause of morbidity, leading to 
disruptions in sleep and mood). 
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there is no apparent direct cause of spontaneous pain, it is not possible to 
calibrate such pain as greater or lesser than would be expected for the 
stimulus or condition. 
To someone with chronic pain, the experience of pain itself might be 
different than that of healthy people, which might be associated with 
differences in brain activity.59 This has been clearly demonstrated in two 
studies that came from A. Vania Apkarian’s lab.60 In the first study, 
researchers showed that the nucleus accumbens, an area typically associated 
with reward processing, was activated in healthy subjects with pain relief; 
but in chronic back pain patients, it was activated during the experimental 
pain itself, suggesting that it provided relief from the ongoing back pain. 61 
In other words, the typically painful stimulus was an analgesic. In a later 
study by the same group, they showed that the transition from subacute to 
chronic pain is associated with a greater involvement of emotion related 
brain areas during pain.62 These studies suggest that in chronic pain, the 
experience of pain takes on new meaning—in healthy people, pain is a 
warning signal that activates mostly sensory and cognitive brain areas, but 
in chronic pain patients, spontaneous pain might be experienced as 
punishing.63  
Pain that is directly linked to a disease state is usually indicated as pain 
from that condition rather than a chronic pain disorder per se.64 For 
example, pain associated with cancer is typically referred to as cancer pain, 
or “chronic cancer pain” when the pain from the disease persists beyond six 
months.65 In those cases, the assumption is that the pain is directly linked to 
 
 59. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. 
 60. See Marwan N. Baliki et al., Predicting Value of Pain and Analgesia: Nucleus Accumbens 
Response to Noxious Stimuli Changes in the Presence of Chronic Pain, 66 NEURON 149 (2010) 
(finding that the nucleus accumbens, an area typically associated with reward processing, was 
activated in healthy subjects with pain relief, but in chronic back pain patients, it was activated 
during the experimental pain itself, suggesting that it provided relief from the ongoing back pain); 
Javeria A. Hashmi et al.,
 
Shape Shifting Pain: Chronification of Back Pain Shifts Brain 
Representation from Nociceptive to Emotional Circuits, 136 BRAIN 2751 (2013) (finding that the 
transition from subacute to chronic pain is associated with greater involvement of emotion related 
brain areas during pain). 
 61. Baliki et al., supra note 60, at 149. 
 62. Hashmi et al., supra note 60, at 2766. 
 63. See id. at 2764 (observing that perception of back pain engages distinct brain activations 
in the emotion and reward circuits in subjects with chronic pain); Baliki et al., supra note 60, at 
149–60 (demonstrating that acute painful stimuli elicit distinct patterns of nucleus accumbens 
activity in chronic back pain patients and healthy controls). 
 64. See A. Vania Apkarian, Marwan N. Baliki & Paul Y. Geha, Toward a Theory of Chronic 
Pain, 87 PROGRESS NEUROBIOLOGY 81, 82 (2009) (listing examples of chronic clinical pain 
conditions related to site and type of injury, such as arthritis, cancer, and diabetes). 
 65. Id. (stating that the common clinical definition of chronic back pain is six months of 
persistent pain following its initial onset). 
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the disease, and that effective treatment of the disease will also result in 
total pain relief.66  
 
B.      Bases for Individual Pain Variability 
 
Panelists and other participants discussed several sources that explain 
the great range of individual differences in pain experience and pain 
reporting.67 They commented on factors that include the nature of the 
disease or illness itself, the accuracy and quality of the diagnosis and 
treatment that the patient receives (with better medical care being strongly 
predictive of better outcomes), the degree of psychosocial support 
experienced by the patient, the psychological and phenotypic make-up of 
the patient, the genetics of pain, and the role of culture on mediating pain 
experience.68 Of note, Professor Karen Davis suggested that the 
neuroimaging of certain mental strategies collectively known as “coping” 
may be more useful than the neuroimaging of pain itself to evaluate an 
individual’s ability to adapt successfully to pain.69 Discussion of these 
many factors was relatively brief, but this discussion serves to point the 
reader toward relevant bodies of research that help to explain individual 
pain variability. 
As a foundational matter, panelists agreed that the quality of medical 
care can explain the variation in patient pain and outcome, and that medical 
mismanagement (such as misdiagnosis or a provider’s over reliance on 
opioids to treat pain) can make a patient’s present pain and future prognosis 
significantly worse.70 In many cases, such factors could account for why 
two patients with apparently equivalent injuries or disease states could 
display significantly different levels of pain and disability.71 
Where patients receive appropriate diagnosis and medical 
management, individual variation in levels of pain and disability still may 
be great. Professors Karen Davis and Jennifer Haythornthwaite contributed 
to the panel by discussing two factors that may bear significantly on patient 
 
 66. An excellent example is orofacial cancer—complete removal of the tumor and borders 
always results in pain relief. Brian L. Schmidt, Biological Mechanisms of Oral Cancer Pain and 
Implications for Clinical Therapy, 91 J. DENTAL RES. 447, 447–48 (2012). 
 67. See, e.g., Panel 2, supra note 1, at 18 (summarizing bases of variability in pain 
experience). 
 68. Id. at 18, 22–24. 
 69. Id. at 15. 
 70. Id. at 21. 
 71. See generally id. (discussing the use and efficacy of opiates and antidepressants in the 
treatment of chronic pain). 
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outcomes: coping and self efficacy.72 Professor Davis introduced the issue 
of coping,73 and studies that she conducted with David Seminowicz found 
that “there are different kinds of phenotypes of people,” which correlate 
strongly with how well subjects can cope with pain.74 According to 
Professor Davis, some individuals who are subjected in the lab to a painful 
stimulus (“we’re zapping them” in the arm) while performing a cognitively 
demanding task can compartmentalize or mentally wander away from the 
pain.75 With other subjects, “their performance on [the cognitive] tasks goes 
down—their coping is terrible.”76 Neuroimaging, she asserted, supports the 
conclusion that these different responses reflect distinct biological 
phenotypes.77 Future research would be needed to determine if the same 
differences would be observed in the context of chronic pain, and to explore 
the question of adaptability—that is, whether phenotypic differences 
between “copers” and “non-copers” are stable, or whether non-copers could 
learn to cope better by modifying their behavior and their biology.78  
Professor Haythornthwaite raised a related issue—the notion that 
differences in pain level and outcome for patients with chronic pain (who 
have otherwise been correctly diagnosed and treated) can be influenced by 
 
 72. Id. at 17–18 (noting that helplessness and inability to cope are associated with negative 
outcomes in chronic pain patients, such as higher reports of pain and disability). 
 73. Id. at 15. 
 74. Id. (referencing David A. Seminowicz & Karen D. Davis, Cortical Responses to Pain in 
Healthy Individuals Depends on Pain Catastrophizing, 120 J. PAIN 297, 302 (2006)) (supporting 
the attentional model of pain catastrophizing, where diminished prefrontal cortical modulation 
impedes disengaging from and suppressing more intense pain). 
 75. Id.; see also Aaron Kucyi, Tim V. Salomons & Karen D. Davis, Mind Wandering away 
from Pain Dynamically Engages Antinociceptive and Default Mode Brain Networks, 110 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18692, 18695 (2013) (describing the relationship between mind wandering and 
perceptual decoupling from pain). 
 76. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 15. 
 77. Id. Davis stated that there are “different brain circuitries associated with whether [people 
are] ‘copers’ or ‘not-copers’.” Id.; see also Nathalie Erpelding & Karen D. Davis, Neural 
Underpinnings of Behavioural Strategies that Prioritize Either Cognitive Task Performance or 
Pain, 154 J. PAIN 2060, 2067 (2013) (distinguishing brain structure, function, and network 
connectivity patterns of “A-type” individuals who prioritize cognitive performance over pain from 
“P-type” individuals whose cognitive performance declines when experiencing concurrent pain); 
Kucyi, Salomons & Davis, supra note 75 (linking individual tendencies to “mind wander” away 
from pain with the function and structure of pain- and attention-related brain networks).  
 78. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 15. If future studies were to establish the existence of coping and 
non-coping phenotypes in response to chronic pain, Professor Davis suggested that the 
neuroimaging of coping—rather than of pain itself—might have significant evidentiary value. Id. 
She opined that “this issue of how much your brain circuitry is set up to cope with pain . . . might 
actually lead us in a better direction[] [b]ecause those things seem to be more stable and 
phenotypic than just seeing what lights up in your brain when you give somebody a stimulus.” Id. 
Imaging of this kind, she suggested, might tell us more about “individual variability” in response 
to dealing with pain. Id.; see also Erpelding & Davis, supra note 77, at 2060 (explaining that 
studies on brain functions between copers and non-copers reveal that potential behavioral changes 
may be made in non-copers to alleviate their pain and their ability to cope with their pain). 
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the patient’s level of self-efficacy79 versus helplessness.80 People who 
measure low on self-efficacy may be described as feeling “helpless . . . in 
the face of difficult circumstances.81 Professor Haythornthwaite noted that 
feelings of “helplessness [are] associated with increased morbidity and 
mortality in people with rheumatoid arthritis. And, in people with chronic 
pain, helplessness is associated with higher reports of pain, greater pain 
related disability, higher levels of depression,” and other negative 
outcomes.82 Professor Haythornthwaite’s research focuses on patients’ 
subjective self perceptions of helplessness as related to pain intensity and 
disability.83 She noted that her research has also shown that negative coping 
strategies, collectively called “catastrophizing,” correlate with increased 
reports of pain and greater levels of future disability.84 Research on 
 
 79. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 17; see also Timothy A. Judge et al., Are Measures of Self-
Esteem, Neuroticism, Locus of Control, and Generalized Self-Efficacy Indicators of a Common 
Core Construct?, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 693, 693 (2002) (explaining that self 
efficacy shares features with other psychological constructs, including the constructs of control 
and neuroticism, demonstrating that these several constructs represent the same mental 
phenomena and are not meaningfully distinct); Barry J. Zimmerman, Self-Efficacy: An Essential 
Motive to Learn, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 82, 83 (2000) (noting that self efficacy is a 
psychological construct that refers to a subject’s degree of perceived control or agency over the 
events in his or her life). 
 80. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 17. 
 81. See Matthias J. Müller, Helplessness and Perceived Pain Intensity: Relations to Cortisol 
Concentrations After Electrocutaneous Stimulation in Healthy Young Men, BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL 
MED., June 2011, at 1, 1–2, available at http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/pdf/1751-0759-5-
8.pdf (noting that there is a correlation between patients that have low self efficacy and feelings of 
helplessness in difficult scenarios). 
 82. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 17. See generally R.R. Edwards et al., Catastrophizing and Pain 
in Arthritis, Fibromyalgia, and Other Rheumatic Diseases, 55 ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 325 
(2006) [hereinafter Pain in Arthritis] (explaining that pain is increasingly seen in patients who 
suffer from rheumatic disease, which can result in the patient catastrophizing the pain and feeling 
helpless); R.R. Edwards et al., Catastrophizing Predicts Changes in Thermal Pain Responses 
After Resolution of Acute Dental Pain, 5 J. PAIN 164 (2004) [hereinafter Catastrophizing Predicts 
Change] (noting that patients who suffer from chronic pain have higher levels of helplessness, 
disability, and depression as a result of catastrophizing their pain). 
 83. See generally Catastrophizing Predicts Change, supra note 82, at 164 (explaining that 
patients who suffer from catastrophizing their chronic pain share feelings of helplessness and 
disability); 2012 Wilbert E. Fordyce Clinical Investigator Award, AM. PAIN SOC’Y, 
http://americanpainsociety.org/get-involved/awards-grants/wilbert-e-fordyce-2012 (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2015) (stating that Professor Haythornthwaite has researched psychosocial aspects of 
pain, with a focus on how negative emotions and pain coping strategies affect pain and pain 
related disability). 
 84. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 17–18; see also L. Buenaver et al., Cognitive-Behavioral Self-
Help for Chronic Pain, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1389, 1389–90 (2006) (noting that cognitive-
behavioral self help is one of the most effective ways of dealing with patient pain catastrophizing); 
Pain in Arthritis, supra note 82, at 325–28 (explaining that patients who catastrophize their pain 
report greater pain and disability); R.R. Edwards et al., Catastrophizing as a Mediator of Sex 
Differences in Pain: Differential Effects for Daily Pain Versus Laboratory-Induced Pain, 111 J. 
INT’L ASS’N STUDY PAIN 335, 335–36 (2004) (noting that how an individual deals with their pain 
will affect their pain levels and disability); Catastrophizing Predicts Change, supra note 82, at 
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helplessness and control provides another dimension in understanding how 
two subjects with substantially similar diagnoses could experience very 
different degrees of pain and disability.85 
Speaking on both the genetics of pain and the role of culture on 
influencing pain experience, Professor Davis noted that Dr. Ze’ev Seltzer 
had attempted to study the prevalence and severity of phantom limb pain in 
Cambodia, a country with many landmine victims.86 The aim of this study 
was to assess the relative prevalence and severity of phantom limb pain 
relative to population level averages in Western amputees.87 Professor 
Davis reported, however, that Dr. Seltzer ran into a conundrum that 
demonstrates the difficulty of translating pain experience across cultures: 
the Western language of “phantom” limb pain could not be translated 
linguistically or culturally into the Cambodian context.88 The researchers 
inadvertently biased the study subjects by suggesting to them that the study 
subjects’ missing limbs and/or persons were demonically possessed.89  
Holding aside challenges of cultural translation like those experienced 
by Dr. Seltzer, Professor Davis noted that researchers may be likely to find 
both individual and population level variation in pain sensitivity. Some of 
this variability may be genetic. Further, culturally mediated constructs 
relating to pain, self, and the experience of the body also likely would lead 
to cross cultural variations not only in the expression of pain but also in the 
actual experience of pain. A growing body of research literature suggests 
these dynamics to be the case, finding some variation in pain sensitivity 
based on genetic, epigenetic, and cultural factors.90 
 
164–65 (noting that catastrophizing pain typically results in greater pain and feelings of 
pessimism). 
 85. See Müller, supra note 81, at 1–4 (noting that recent laboratory studies have shown that 
enforced helplessness increases pain sensitivity). Where young, healthy male research subjects 
were allowed either to give themselves an electric shock or were subjected to an equal strength 
electric shock out of their control, they reported significantly more pain in the no control or 
“helpless” condition. Id. Researchers found that in the helpless condition, subjects produced more 
of the stress hormone cortisol, which itself can heighten pain experience. Id. Individuals with 
chronic pain could vary both on their psychological evaluation of their situation and the extent to 
which, like the lab subjects, pain occurs without any control on the part of the subject; both could 
heighten cortisol and, hence, pain experience. Id. 
 86. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 23; see also Mervyn Rothstein, Columnist Mervyn Rothstein 
Interviews Dr. Ze’ev Seltzer, THE FACIAL PAIN RESEARCH FOUND., 
http://www.facingfacialpain.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=181&Itemid=
137 (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (noting that research has been collected from 6,000 amputees in 
Cambodia to analyze chronic pain).  
 87. Rothstein, supra note 86.  
 88. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 23. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See, e.g., Kathy Lasch et al., Psychological and Cultural Influences on Pain and Recovery 
from Landmine Injury, 7 PAIN MED. S213, S213–15 (2006) (noting that various cultural factors 
such as the amputee’s societal acceptance can have negative effects on the amputee). Cultural 
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It is worth noting that some research also points in the other direction, 
finding no meaningful difference in average pain experience across very 
different populations.91 A recent study found no difference in the 
prevalence and severity of phantom limb and stump pain in amputees in 
New Zealand versus in Cambodia.92 Some researchers exploring the 
hypothesis that the traumatic context of an injury leads to outcomes with a 
higher likelihood of chronic pain have also reached a negative result.93 
Panelists were also mindful of the history of stereotyping groups relative to 
pain sensitivity, and the role that stereotypes can play in the disparity of 
effective pain treatment.94 
 
C.      Evaluating Pain Sensitivity 
 
1.     Pain rating scales and tools 
 
[E]ven those of us who make a living out of evaluating pain 
sensitivity in people and rely on these numbers to tell us 
something . . . make certain assumptions that [don’t hold up, 
even] in a pristine laboratory setting, [and] . . . in kind of real 
world situations . . . they’re [even more] questionable [where a 
person may have an incentive to be untruthful]. 
Prof. Joel Greenspan95 
 
factors like the isolation and shunning of amputees can have devastating effects on survivors and 
their long term outcomes. See Bridgett Rahim-Williams et al., A Quantitative Review on Ethnic 
Group Difference in Experimental Pain Response: Do Biology, Psychology and Culture Matter? 
13 PAIN MED. 522, 535–37 (2012) (examining and confirming various studies determining that an 
individual’s biology, psychology, and culture impact their pain). 
 91. See, e.g., Kelly Patrick Anthony Byrne, Survey of Phantom Limb Pain, Phantom 
Sensation and Stump Pain in Cambodian and New Zealand Amputees, 12 PAIN MED. 794, 795 
(2011) (finding, in a study of limb pain in different ethnic cultures, that there was no substantial 
difference in the cultures’ pain experience). 
 92. See id. (noting that researchers could not find substantial differences in how different 
cultures respond to similar phantom limb pain scenarios).  
 93. See Hans Husum et al., Chronic Pain in Land Mine Accident Survivors in Cambodia and 
Kurdistan, 55 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1813, 1813–16 (2002) (assessing a study on the differences in 
various cultures and how their personal background affects their pain and pain related problems). 
 94. See Panel 2, supra note 1, at 22–23. A recent study in the U.S. found that black and 
hispanic patients tend to receive significantly less pain control medication than white male 
patients following identical surgical procedures. See H. Jack Geiger, Racial and Ethnic Disparities 
in Diagnosis and Treatment: A Review of the Evidence and a Consideration of Causes, in 
UNEQUAL TREATMENT, CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE 417, 
425 (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson, eds., 2003). Such disparities may be 
grounded in providers’ implicit assumptions that the non white patients’ reports of pain are 
exaggerated or reflect drug seeking behavior. Id. 
 95. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4. 
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Pain evaluation techniques are designed to help determine how much 
pain a patient experiences and to allow for the benchmarking of a patient’s 
pain relative to other patients with substantially similar histories and 
conditions.96 Professor Greenspan discussed the most common pain 
evaluation technique, in which a patient is asked to rate his or her pain on a 
scale from zero to ten, with zero being no pain and ten being the worst pain 
imaginable.97 Panelists then engaged in a discussion of the pain rating scale 
and various issues relating to pain reporting and evaluation.98 The themes 
and issues that emerged from this discussion included the imprecision of 
existing pain rating scales, the degree of subjective variation (both in how 
people experience pain and in how they report and communicate their pain), 
and, finally, the important variation in how parties consuming the 
information (like doctors and legal actors) hear and interpret pain reports.99  
Because pain is a personal experience, the gold standard for pain 
measurement is self reporting.100 In clinical and research settings, pain is 
often evaluated on a 10 point numerical rating scale, where 0 is no pain and 
10 is the worst pain imaginable.101 Other pain measures, including the 
McGill Pain Questionnaire,102 are commonly used to determine the sensory 
and affective qualities of the pain.103 Professor Greenspan noted that you 
have to assume in this kind of situation is that one patient’s “three” is the 
same as another patient’s “three,” and that everybody who says “three” is 
reflecting a similar perceptual level of pain and distress.”104 But this is 
merely a simplifying assumption that clinicians make “for the sake of doing 
 
 96. See Maria Alexandra Ferreira-Valente et al., Validity of Four Pain Intensity Rating 
Scales, 152 PAIN MED. 2399, 2399–402 (2011) (explaining the different pain evaluation 
techniques and their various merits). 
 97. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 2; see also NAT’L PHARM. COUNCIL, PAIN: CURRENT 
UNDERSTANDING OF ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND TREATMENTS 25 (2001), available at 
http://www.npcnow.org/system/files/research/download/Pain-Current-Understanding-of-
Assessment-Management-and-Treatments.pdf (noting that this zero to ten scale rating is referred 
to as the Numerical Rating Scale (“NRS”)). 
 98. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
 99. Id. at 2–6. 
 100. See NAT’L PHARM. COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 21 (noting that a patient’s ability to 
express their pain is the preferred method of pain diagnosis since pain is subjective). 
 101. See Ferreira-Valente et al., supra note 96, at 2399–400 (noting that the NRS has been 
demonstrated to be accurate and user friendly to patients). 
 102. See Ronald Melzack, The McGill Pain Questionnaire: Major Properties and Scoring 
Methods, 1 J. PAIN 277, 277 (1975) (explaining that the McGill Pain Questionnaire consists of 3 
classes of pain descriptors used by patients to specify their pain). 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4; see also Ferreira-Valente et al., supra note 96, at 2399 
(explaining that pain research studies have demonstrated that different pain measures yield 
comparable results, demonstrating their efficacy and reliability for different levels of pain). 
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anything practical in a clinical setting.”105 Apart from the practical value of 
the assumption, “we have no way of knowing if that’s true or not.”106 To 
help physicians or others corroborate the patient’s rating of pain (or, vice 
versa, to call it into question), clinicians also look at “other kinds of 
evidence, behavior, facial expressions, things like that.”107 But this is not a 
precise practice, as there is no “formula for that.”108 
Professor Adam Kolber noted that a central challenge in using and 
making sense of the pain rating scale is that it instructs patients to rate their 
pain from zero to ten, where ten is “the worst pain imaginable.” This makes 
the rating scale “as much a test about imagination as it is about pain.”109 A 
person who has “a very vivid imagination about the worst pain that there 
could be” would rate his pain as less severe, while a person with a duller 
imagination might rate his equal degree of pain as being more severe, even 
though both patients are experiencing the same degree of pain, distress, and 
disability.110 Professor Kolber commented that he could rate his pain of a 
sprained elbow at a “1” simply because he could imagine the horrors of the 
Inquisition, but Professor Kolber’s elbow does not hurt more or less than if 
his benchmark for the worst pain imaginable is the time he had a 
toothache.111  
For clinicians assessing patients, each patient’s individualized and 
subjective use of the rating scale may not present a great problem: the 
clinician’s role is to understand that particular patient’s perceived level of 
pain and distress, and to treat the pain appropriately.112 The individualized 
meaning of pain ratings, however, becomes highly important in comparing 
 
 105. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4; see also Melzack, supra note 102, at 278 (noting that there are 
severe limitations with the pain questionnaire due to the complexity of variable pain). 
 106. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4; see also Melzack, supra note 102, at 278 (explaining that pain 
is a subjective experience, so it is hard to quantify a person’s perceptual level of pain). 
 107. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4; see also Melzack, supra note 102, at 278–79 (explaining that 
the researchers not only took into account the subjects’ descriptions of pain, but also accounted for 
their different cultural, socio-economic, and educational backgrounds when assessing their pain 
levels). Such questions include “what activities is this person still doing?” and “what is he or she 
avoiding?” But this is not a precise practice, as there is no “formula for that.” Panel 2, supra note 
1, at 4. 
 108. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4. 
 109. Id. at 6; see also Amelia Williamson & Barbara Hoggart, Pain: A Review of Three 
Commonly Used Pain Rating Scales, 14 J. CLINICAL NURSING 798, 800–01 (2004) (describing 
various numerical pain rating scales, ranging from a 10 point scale to 101 point scales). 
 110. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 6; see also Williamson & Hoggart, supra note 109, at 799 
(describing the subjective nature of pain and the typical ‘no pain’ to ‘worst pain imaginable’ 
descriptors on pain scales). 
 111. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 6. 
 112. See NANCY WELLS ET AL., 1 PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-BASED 
HANDBOOK FOR NURSES ch. 17, at 472–73, 476 (2008) (emphasizing that documentation of pain 
assessment is necessary so the clinician can best interpret the patient’s pain and the appropriate 
care plan). 
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pain across patients and across populations of patients.113 If pain ratings on 
the zero to ten scale are incommensurate across patients, reflecting not only 
the subject’s physical experience but psychological and even imaginative 
make up, it becomes challenging to say that a particular injury or condition 
typically hurts at about a “three,” because any reported “three” has meaning 
relative to the person providing the rating, and it is not relative to some 
absolute level of pain sensation that would allow researchers to establish an 
average or typical level of pain for a particular condition.114  
 
2.     Neuroimaging corroborates variation in pain reporting for acute,  
     lab induced pain 
 
In addition to informing us which brain areas are activated during the 
experience of pain, pain neuroimaging studies have also provided a 
neurological basis for individual differences in pain sensitivity and 
coping.115 For example, Professor Greenspan referred to “the classic first 
demonstration of this type of phenomena, [which] came from Bob Coghill’s 
paper that was in [the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences]”116 that showed the relationship between pain neuroimaging and 
the subjective report.117 In that study, healthy participants were exposed to 
a thermal stimulus in the MRI scanner.118 The temperature was the same 
for all participants, but the pain intensity ratings varied greatly, spanning 
almost the entire 0 to 10 scale.119 Coghill then divided participants into two 
groups: a high sensitivity group (those who rated pain above a 6 out of 10) 
and a low sensitivity group (those who rated pain below a 4 out of 10).120 
Comparing brain activity between these two groups, the high sensitivity 
 
 113. See Melzack, supra note 102, at 282 (describing a study conducted with 297 diverse 
patients, each suffering from different kinds of pain); Stefaan Van Damme, A Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis of the Pain Catastrophizing Scale: Invariant Factor Structure Across Clinical 
and Non-Clinical Populations, 96 J. PAIN 319, 319–320 (2001) (explaining the benefit of 
examining the pain catastrophizing scale over a wide variety of patients with and without pain, 
and across clinical and non-clinical populations). 
 114. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4. See also Henry K. Beecher, The Measurement of Pain: 
Prototype for the Quantitative Study of Subjective Responses, 9 PHARMACOLOGICAL REVS. 59, 
62–64 (1957) (emphasizing that pain is a subjective perception that varies from person to person 
and is resultantly difficult to operationally define and test). 
 115. See Robert C. Coghill et al., Neural Correlates of Interindividual Differences in the 
Subjective Experience of Pain, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8538, 8538–42 (2003) (explaining a 
functional MRI neuroimaging study of inter-individual differences in pain sensitivity). 
 116. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. See Coghill et al., supra note 115. 
 117. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. See Coghill et al., supra note 115, at 8538 (explaining the 
effective use of brain imaging tests in conjunction with subjective pain reports). 
 118. Coghill et al., supra note 115, at 8538. 
 119. Id. at 8538–40. 
 120. Id. at 8539. 
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group had greater activity in the primary somatosensory cortex and mid 
cingulate cortex—areas that are thought to encode pain intensity and the 
emotional salience of pain.121 The activity level in the thalamus, however, 
did not differ between groups, suggesting that the nociceptive input to the 
brain was identical, and that the difference in experience must be related to 
the difference in cortical activation.122  
Several pain neuroimaging research groups have found similar results. 
Professor Davis noted that “[many] of us who were monkeying around in 
the noise found similar things, and we didn’t talk about it for a couple of 
years. We found this correlation between the amount of pain they say they 
reported and the amount [that the] fMRI signal [detected].”123 In addition, a 
number of studies have reported on brain areas whose activity correlates 
with pain intensity.124 
Another example of neuroimaging corroborating with the individual 
experience is a study that examined the relationship between pain 
catastrophizing and pain related activity.125 In that study, participants 
experienced pain while in the MRI scanner, but the pain intensity was set to 
be the same for everyone.126 Despite experiencing the same pain intensity, 
subjects who scored high on pain catastrophizing showed increased activity 
in several regions of the insula cortex—an area thought to be involved in 
emotional processing.127 This enhanced brain activity in emotional regions 
could reflect the fact that pain catastrophizing is associated with the fear 
that pain will become more serious and will not end.128 Similar associations 
 
 121. Id. at 8538, 8541. 
 122. Id. at 8541. 
 123. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. 
 124. See, e.g., M.N. Baliki, et al., Parsing Pain Perception Between Nociceptive 
Representation and Magnitude Estimation, 101 J. NEUROSCIENCE 875 (2009) (concluding that 
pain perception is a result of the transformation of nociceptive representation into a subjective 
magnitude assessment within the insula); K. Bornhovd et al., Painful Stimuli Evoke Different 
Stimulus-Response Functions in the Amygdala, Prefrontal, Insula and Somatosensory Cortex: A 
Single-Trial fMRI Study, 125 J. NEUROSCIENCE 1326 (2002) (finding that brain responses evoked 
by four different pain stimuli intensities ranged from warm to painful); Yoshitestsu Oshiro et al., 
Brain Mechanisms Supporting Discrimination of Sensory Features of Pain: A New Model, 29 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 14924, 14928 (2009) (finding that memory activation in the brain correlated with 
pain intensity activation). 
 125. See Seminowicz & Davis, supra note 74 (discussing a study in which a fMRI was 
performed on 22 healthy individuals while they underwent two pain intensity levels in order to 
understand the psychological pain catastrophizing factors associated with each person’s 
experience of pain). 
 126. Id. at 298. 
 127. Id. at 300–01. 
 128. See Judith Turner & Leslie Aaron, Pain-Related Catastrophizing: What Is It?, 71 
CLINICAL J. PAIN 65, 65–66 (2001) (describing catastrophizing as dwelling on the worst possible 
outcome of a particular circumstance when there is any possibility this outcome could ensue). 
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between pain catastrophizing and pain related brain activity have been 
reported in chronic pain patients.129  
Knowing that neuroimaging data corroborates subjective pain 
experience could be useful in the legal system. One is still faced with the 
limitation, however, that these findings are based on an average across a 
group. Further, it still brings us to a “reverse inference problem:”130 “[in] 
any one case, if we see this level of activation, do we know that that 
person’s really experiencing a level of pain that matches the average 
picture?”131 Professor Davis also mentioned a limitation related to the 
specificity of the neuroimaging signals in brain areas that are involved in 
multiple cognitive functions: “If you’re feeling more pain, you’re probably 
paying more attention to it, and it’s probably more unpleasant, and it’s 
probably more upsetting. And if you’re looking at a place in the brain like 
the cingulate cortex, which everything happens in the cingulate cortex . . . 
we can’t separate these things.”132 
Despite these pitfalls, neuroimaging generally supports the theory that 
the subjective experience should be promising and useful in legal settings, 
as it would suggest a neurobiological basis for pain sensitivity and coping. 
While claims of pain might, in some cases, seem unrealistic, it is clear from 
both neuroimaging and psychophysics studies that there exists great 








 129. See R. H. Gracely, Pain Catastrophizing and Neural Responses to Pain Among Persons 
with Fibromyalgia, 127 BRAIN 835, 836 (2004) (explaining that psychosocial factors relating to 
pain catastrophizing may play a significant role in patients with chronic pain). 
 130. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. See L. Van Oudenhove, Understanding Gut-Brain 
Interaction in Gastrointestinal Pain by Neuroimaging: Lessons from Somatic Pain Studies, 23 
NEUROGRASTROENTEROLOGY & MOTILITY 292, 299 (2011) (explaining that reverse inference 
refers to “reasoning backwards from the presence of activation of a certain region known to be 
involved in a particular cognitive function”). Reverse inference is also discussed in more detail in 
Panel 4. Dr. Martha Farah, PhD, Judge Nancy Gertner, & Prof. Stacey Tovino, Imaging the Brain, 
Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 4: Translational 
Expectations and Issues: Making it Work in Practice (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 4] 
(transcript on file with the editors). 
 131. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. 
 132. Id.; see also Alexander Shackman et al., The Integration of Negative Affect, Pain and 
Cognitive Control in the Cingulate Cortex, 12 NAT’L REV. NEUROSCIENCE 154 (2011) 
(describing the cingulate cortex as one of the most prominent features of the brain). 
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III.      LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING BRAIN BASED 
PAIN 
 
A.      Pain Interpretation by Judges and Jurors 
 
The Honorable Morris Hoffman, a frequent commentator on law and 
neuroscience and a founding member of the MacArthur Law & 
Neuroscience Project, spoke on the ways in which legal doctrines and legal 
actors struggle with issues relating to pain.133 He introduced several key 
themes: the variability of pain itself combined with the variability that 
decision makers (like judges and jurors) have in being able to understand 
the pain of others; the composite nature of pain as both a physical 
phenomenon and a narrative experience that has meaning within the context 
of an individual’s life; and the difficulties of “mind-reading,” which are 
present in relation to many legal determinations, but which may be 
particularly acute in relation to pain and suffering.134 Judge Hoffman’s 
comments appear here largely in their original form: 
 
I’m interested in, and I think the law’s interested in pain 
[and the] problems that pain raises for two related 
reasons . . . : It’s everywhere [and] everybody’s already 
talked about this, [and pain] is everywhere in the law. . . I 
think [this] is one of [the] few areas of the law that the law 
might not be very good at.135  
 
[Professor Hank Greely] spoke eloquently136 about how 
humans are mind-reading machines. Many legal processes 
turn on a kind of mind-reading. We care very much in legal 
processes about this always difficult process of reading 
other peoples’ minds. Different people may have different 
fears when confronted with someone with a gun, or who 
might look like he has a gun: some of us might have fears 
great enough to justify self defense, some of us might not, 
and as judges and jurors, we need to get into the mind of 
 
 133. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 9. 
 134. Id. at 9–11. 
 135. Id. at 9; see generally Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001) 
(stating that the role of emotions in the law has been “much neglected” and that legal theory is 
“unprepared” to discuss the relationship between emotions and the law). 
 136. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 9. Prof. Greely spoke about mind-reading in the law and using 
fMRI as a potential mind-reading technology in his keynote address that opened the conference. 
Id. 
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the person claiming self defense to figure out which is the 
case. So the law really struggles with that. All of these 
emotions and mental states that the law cares about are 
subjective and variable. 
 
But pain seems especially difficult.  
. . . 
I think there’s something about pain that is harder than 
these other emotions to deal with in law. And I can think of 
three reasons why that might be.  
 
First, pain is enormously variable, perhaps more than other 
emotions. Not just between people but within people. . . . 
the same stimulus can have enormously different effects 
within people. 
 
[Second,] I’m starting to think that pain is really 
complicated. [Laughter in the room.] There’s a 
narrative . . . aspect to pain [and to the role that the pain 
plays in an individual’s life that may affect how a person 
experiences pain and how much it impairs him or her].137 
 
[Third,] . . . the law is really good at operationalizing 
human nature and having rules based on thousands of years 
of trial and error, [but] there are a couple of areas that I 
worry about, where we’re not so good at—pain . . . [and] 
probability. . . humans just are not good at probability, and 
therefore the law is not very good at probability. . . . And I 
worry that one of the things the law’s not good at, because 
humans are not good at [it] is empathizing [with] certain 
kinds of pain—chronic pain. . . . [F]or some reason, I think 
most people don’t believe in chronic pain.138 
 
 
 137. Id. at 9–10. See generally Coghill, supra note 16, at 1531–35 (“The experience of a 
sensory event is highly subjective and can vary substantially from one individual to the next.”); 
Robert C. Coghill et al., The Subjective Experience of Pain: Where Expectations Become Reality, 
102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12950, 12950 (2005) (noting that the subjective experience of pain 
has long remained a perplexing and challenging clinical problem). 
 138. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 10. For further discussion on the empathy of people to the pain of 
others, see Phillip L. Jackson, Pierre Rainville & Jean Decety, To What Extent Do We Share the 
Pain of Others? Insight from the Neural Bases of Pain Empathy, 125 J. PAIN 5, 8 (2006) (studying 
the neurological impacts of pain inflicted upon one’s self versus pain inflicted against others). 
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Judge Hoffman then elaborated on each of these three points. On the 
question of the variability of pain, he commented briefly that most people, 
including himself, share the intuition that a person would be more severely 
injured by an objectively severe accident—say, a car crash that occurs at 30 
miles per hour versus a crash at 10 miles per hour.139 Statistically, that 
generally will be true.140 Yet, he noted, that may not be the outcome in any 
individual case, as a myriad of factors peculiar to the accident itself and to 
the person involved in the accident could cause the victim in the low speed 
crash to experience more pain and disability than the person in higher speed 
crash.141 Jurors and judges have a hard time grappling with the cases that 
are both unusual and counterintuitive.142 It is easier, instead, to rely on 
more objective measures of severity (the damage to the car or the presence 
of broken bones) as the benchmark for how much pain a claimant likely 
feels or felt.143 Judges and jurors may be particularly inclined to doubt 
plaintiffs who raise these unusual or counterintuitive pain claims because of 
the prospect of financial gain from lawsuits.144 In this way, doubt about the 
subjective and variable nature of pain, particularly pain that results from 
outwardly minor injuries, acts to some extent as an anti fraud device, 
though this “device” produces both false positives and false negatives.145 
The key form of variability that Judge Hoffman focused on, however, 
is the variability among decision makers in being able to understand the 
pain of others.146 He described a case that he presided over a decade ago: 
 
I remember a sort of gruesome products liability case . . . 
and it involved a woman who was using a cleaning product 
that had a small warning [on the bottle that stated:] “use 
 
 139. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 11. 
 140. See generally Table 1108. Speeding-Related Traffic Fatalities by Road Type, Speed Limit, 
and State: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2012), 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1108.pdf (indicating that in interstate 
travel, 964 fatalities occurred in accidents where the vehicle was traveling over 55 miles per hour 
compared to 287 fatalities where the vehicle was traveling at below 55 miles per hour). 
 141. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 11; see also Jeffery Tucker, Injury with Low-Speed Collisions, 
DYNAMIC CHIROPRACTIC, May 22, 1995, 
http://www.dynamicchiropractic.com/mpacms/dc/article.php?id=40251 (outlining factors that may 
influence injuries suffered in low speed car crashes). 
 142. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 11. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 10 (noting that it is hard for people to believe when plaintiffs experience certain 
types of chronic pain). 
 145. Id. at 10–11. 
 146. Id. at 9–10; see also Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions 20 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., 
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 103, 2000) (discussing the variability of 
juries, the role of jury emotions in their decision making, and the possibility that jury emotions do 
not improve their ability to measure pain and suffering of others).  
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rubber gloves with this product.” She used it without rubber 
gloves, and then got terrible, terrible, terrible burns on her 
hands.147  
 
As a result, the woman had multiple surgeries to repair the skin on her 
hands and still had ongoing pain.148 Judge Hoffman noted that the plaintiff 
had claims for medical damages and also for “enormous amounts [in 
damages] for pain and suffering.”149 What struck Judge Hoffman was the 
way in which the plaintiff’s attorney questioned potential members of the 
jury during jury selection.150 For the plaintiff and her attorney, he noted, the 
key issue was determining which jurors are going to be able to imagine that 
kind of pain. Some people are going to be able to imagine that and some 
people are not.151 Accordingly, the attorney had to determine through 
skillful questioning which potential jurors might be able to imaginatively 
project themselves into the victim’s position and understand what it feels 
like to have the pain that she claimed she had, and which jurors may even 
have had hand injuries themselves which would make them more aware of 
the degree of the impairment.152 Just as people vary in their pain sensitivity, 
Judge Hoffman commented, people also vary in their ability to feel or 
believe in the pain of others as well as how a person ought to cope with 
pain depending on the persons norms and values.153 This adds potential 
uncontrolled variability across cases, which may or may not be fair to the 
parties, and that to some extent, is intrinsic in the jury system itself.154 
Moving on to the issue of how we think about or conceptualize the 
experience of pain, Judge Hoffman analogized pain to another biological 
yet subjective and legally important phenomenon—memory. He 
commented that  
 
 
 147. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 9. Judge Hoffman explained that the legal issue in the case 
related to whether the small warning on the bottle was adequate in light of the risk of harm posed 
by the product. Id. For the complete opinion of the case discussed by Judge Hoffman, see Uptain 
v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322 (Colo. 1986). 
 148. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 9; see also Uptain, 723 P.2d at 1324. 
 149. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 9. 
 150. Id. at 9–10. 
 151. Id. at 9–10 (explaining that the attorney utilized the example of pulling a sliver from one’s 
finger to determine which jurors seemed to perceive the idea of pain more than others). 
 152. Id. at 10. 
 153. Id. at 9–10; see generally Phillip L. Jackson, Andrew N. Meltzoff & Jean Decety, How do 
we Perceive the Pain of Others? A Window into the Neural Processes Involved in Empathy, 24 
NEUROIMAGE 771, 771 (2005) (finding that there is “partial cerebral commonality between 
perceiving pain in another individual and experiencing it oneself”). 
 154. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 11. 
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there was a time when we thought memory was like a tape 
recorder. That time roughly matches the time when tape 
recorders were invented. And then when computers were 
invented . . . the models changed to talk about things like 
“working memory” and these sorts of things . . . [and] it’s 
becoming clear with memory that it’s not exactly like any 
of [these technologies]. . . . [T]here’s a narrative aspect [to 
memory that’s quite different from what a tape recorder or 
a computer does]—it’s constantly consolidating, it’s 
constantly changing, [and] what we think about affects our 
memory [and] how we think about it affects our 
memory . . . it seems to me that this may very well be true 
about pain as well.  
 
And of course in court we’re often talking about a mixture 
of pain and memory, so when [parties] testify about their 
current or their past pain, that’s this conflation of this 
memory about pain . . . .155 
 
Judge Hoffman’s perspective on the biographical aspects in 
experiencing pain and the relationship between pain and memory point in a 
somewhat different direction than statements by other conference 
participants about the possible quantification of pain.156 Part of the variable 
nature of the experience of pain, he suggests, is that we bring ourselves to 
it.157 Prior panelists commented that one person’s “three” on the pain scale 
may not be equivalent to another person’s “three” based on factors that 
range from genetics to culture to degree of imagination.158 Judge 
Hoffman’s comments suggest that two raters’ evaluations of pain, as well as 
the pain that two raters might experience in response to the same or similar 
condition, might also vary because of their individual life histories, 
personalities, and ways of making meaning. 
In his final point, Judge Hoffman explored whether the legal system 
itself is simply ill suited to certain kinds of determinations, such as 
determinations about certain kinds of pain that are based on predictable and 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Compare id. at 3–4 (reporting that Dr. Greenspan discussed the difficulty of examining 
and quantifying feelings of pain across large sample populations), with supra text accompanying 
note 153.  
 157. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 9; see also Margaret C. Rodgers, Subjective Pain Testimony In 
Disability Determination Proceedings: Can Pain Alone Be Disabling?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 173, 
173 (1992) (explaining that every person experiences pain differently). 
 158. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 4. 
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common flaws in human reasoning.159 He noted that “humans just are not 
good at probability, and therefore the law is not very good at probability. 
[But u]nfortunately, probability is everywhere in the law.”160 Similarly, he 
remarked that humans are not very good at multi-factor causal reasoning.161 
Yet, causation is a crucial legal concept; the outcomes of many cases turn 
on determinations about the relative importance of various causes to an 
ultimate outcome. “I worry,” he said, “that one of the things the law’s not 
good at, because humans are not good at [it], is empathizing certain kinds of 
pain, [particularly] chronic pain.”162 Judge Hoffman went so far as to assert 
that he worries that “most people don’t believe in chronic pain. It’s hard to 
believe that [this hand, which looks fine, and maybe works fine,] . . . still 
hurts. It’s hard for people to believe that when the stimulus is gone, the pain 
is still there.”163 Additionally, he opined that judges may be no better than 
jurors in that regard—indeed, they “may be worse,” because their work 
somewhat inures them to suffering.164 
Judge Hoffman commented that in his role as a law professor, he 
noticed that students seem to have a much easier time crediting pain that is 
associated with a visible injury or a visible disease process, like phantom 
limb pain or degenerative arthritic pain.165 Judge Hoffman noticed that 
when he teaches students about phantom limb pain, the students seem more 
understanding and they don’t have any problem with it the way that they do 
with other kinds of chronic pain.166 Judge Hoffman wonders if it is because 
the injury is visible or if maybe it has to do with sympathy for someone—
they’ve lost the leg so we’ll believe they’re also hurting a little bit where 
the leg isn’t there.167 Other kinds of chronic pain that people don’t seem to 
have problems with include arthritic pain and some clearly degenerative 
kinds of chronic pain.168 
In contrast to pain that relates to missing limbs or to degenerative 
processes that jurors can see on an x-ray, Judge Hoffman asserted that most 
 
 159. Id. at 10; see generally Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1574, 1574–76 (1987) (explaining the struggle the law has with the notion of empathy). 
 160. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 10. 
 161. See id. (explaining that it is difficult for people to accept that pain exists where there is no 
physical stimulus present); see also Jody Lynne Madeira, Recognizing Odysseus’ Scar: 
Reconceptualizing Pain and Its Empathetic Role in Civil Adjudication, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 41, 
48 (2006) (explaining that people may be uncertain when the perceived pain does not accompany 
the physical stimulus). 
 162. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 10. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 11. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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people have difficulty believing in the reality of chronic pain.169 He 
observed that  
 
the kind of pain that starts off with a physical stimulus, and 
[where] the physical stimulus is removed and the pain is 
still there, jurors just have real problems with that . . . . the 
good news is that gets rid of the fakers . . . . But the bad 
news is that . . . because of this built in skepticism about 
chronic pain, I think jurors are, in general, undervaluing 
these cases because they just don’t believe these plaintiffs, 
which is a terrible thing.170 
 
Judge Hoffman concluded with his hope that neuroimaging and other 
pain sciences could help jurors understand the reality of chronic pain 
conditions or that it could help with more direct ways of establishing the 
presence of pain. “It doesn’t have to be perfect,” he said.171 “All it has to be 
is marginally better than what we have now, which is [almost] nothing.”172  
 
B.     Evidentiary Considerations and Frameworks for Neuroimaging 
Evidence of Pain 
 
Judge Hoffman explicated several of the important issues that arise in 
the law relating to chronic pain, particularly pain that non-specialists might 
consider to be unusual.173 According to Judge Hoffman, the major issue 
(elaborated more fully above) is that pain is “everywhere in the law,” yet 
typical judges, jurors, and other decision makers “don’t believe in” pain that 
they cannot see, that persists in the absence of an injury, or that seems in 
excess of what a non-specialist would expect for the condition.174 He 
concluded with his opinion that neuroimaging or other scientific evidence 
that could help to address these issues would be tremendously helpful 
because “what we have now . . . is [almost] nothing.”175 
 
 169. Id.; see also Shaun Cassin, Eggshell Minds and Invisible Injuries: Can Neuroscience 
Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 929, 937–38 (2001) 
(stating that people are doubtful of others’ pain). 
 170. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 10–11; see also Madeira, supra note 161. 
 171. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 11. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 9–11. 
 174. Id. at 10; see also, e.g., Cassin, supra note 169 (stating that understanding the pain of 
others is difficult and raises issue of doubt). 
 175. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 11. 
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Building on Judge Hoffman’s comments, Professor Michael Pardo, a 
professor of evidence law who has published widely in the area of 
epistemology, law and neuroscience, and philosophy of law, offered his 
views on the considerations involved in deciding whether to admit 
neuroscience based evidence of chronic pain.176 First, he offered legal and 
theoretical considerations that pertain to scientific evidence in general, and 
then provided specific insights relating to the neuroscience based evidence 
of pain.177 He framed his remarks by noting that while he would address the 
law of evidence specifically by including factors like the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the Daubert test for expert evidence, the issues in evidence 
law go beyond the Rules.178 More fundamentally, he suggested that it is 
necessary to evaluate “evidence policy and the process of legal proof,” 
which involve considerations ranging from the normative goals of the legal 
system to the ways in which legal actors and lay people engage in decision 
making.179  
Professor Pardo opened with the framing assertion that, “[f]rom an 
evidentiary perspective, the fundamental issue that we’re focusing on [in 
this and in any other legal arena] is trying to separate out true claims from 
false claims.”180 In this vein, Professor Pardo focused his comments on 
important issues in evidence law relating to the proof of claims and the 
scope of expert testimony.181 Although not addressing individual pain 
variability itself, Professor Pardo’s comments frame the evidentiary issues 
and choices common to the introduction of neuroimaging evidence on any 
contested point, in any matter.  
To understand whether any kind of scientific evidence helps us to 
separate true claims from false claims, Professor Pardo explained that we 
need to understand “two different kinds of mistakes” that a test or other 
diagnostic material can produce.182 There are “false positives,” meaning 
that the evidence indicates that a claim is true when in fact it is false.183 
There are also “false negatives,” meaning that the evidence indicates that a 
 
 176. Id. at 13. 
 177. Id. at 11–13. 
 178. Id. at 18. 
 179. Id. at 11; see generally Michael S. Pardo, Evidence Theory and the NAS Report on 
Forensic Science, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 367, 369–75 (2010) (providing a guide to the terms 
“evidence theory” and “legal proof”). 
 180. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12. 
 181. Id. at 18–20. 
 182. Id. at 12. 
 183. Id.; see also Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting For Error In Latent 
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 994–95 (2005) (explaining the 
idea of “false positives”). 
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claim is false when in fact it is true.184 These two categories of mistakes 
exist along with two categories of accurate results: true positives and true 
negatives.185 So there are four kinds or categories of possible results from 
any scientific or medical evidence: true (accurate) positives; true (accurate) 
negatives; false positives; and false negatives.186  
Professor Pardo emphasized that “[i]t’s these four possibilities we 
should keep in mind when we’re thinking about evidence policy” in 
deciding whether to introduce any type of scientific or medical evidence.187 
In considering whether to admit a new test into evidence, he noted that  
 
we should consider not only the results that the test will 
produce, but also the state of affairs that the absence of the 
test would produce; then we must evaluate which is the 
better state. A test [any test—not pain neuroimaging per se] 
might detect true claims that otherwise would go 
undetected. But it might also produce many false positives. 
So are we better off with a system wide level detecting 
more true claims but also screening in more false 
claims?188  
 
Speaking of neuroimaging based evidence specifically, Professor 
Pardo commented that  
 
 
 184. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Cole, supra note 183 (explaining the idea of “false 
negatives”). 
 185. See CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUS. & FDA STAFF: STATISTICAL GUIDANCE ON REPORTING RESULTS FROM 
STUDIES EVALUATING DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 35 (2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/ucm071287.pdf (defining what qualifies as a true negative result and a true positive result); see 
also Devashish Sharma et. al., The Concept of Sensitivity and Specificity in Relation to Two Types 
of Errors and its Application in Medical Research, 2 J. RELIABILITY & STATISTICAL STUD. 53, 
53–54 (2009) (explaining that when sick people are correctly diagnosed as sick, they are termed as 
“true positive,” and when healthy people are correctly identified as healthy, they are termed as 
“true negative”).  
 186. See CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 185, at 34–35 (defining the 
four categories as determined by the designated reference standard). 
 187. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12. See generally Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental 
Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 660 (2013) (acknowledging the 
importance of neuroscientific evidence in courtrooms and the use of such evidence to craft public 
policy). 
 188. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Michael S. Pardo, The Nature and Purpose of 
Evidence Theory, 66 VAND. L. REV. 547, 573 (2013) (describing the differences between 
introducing evidence in litigation and the theoretical issues surrounding evidence). 
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on this issue of chronic pain, you might think, well, 
[admitting neuroimaging evidence of individual pain] 
would be terrible because it would lead to all sorts of 
mistakes [like] false positives. Or you might think this will 
be wonderful because we’ll pick up lots of true claims we 
might miss. Well, that’s really only half of the picture. We 
should also be comparing that with what the world would 
look like if we were to exclude this evidence. How many 
false negative claims would you have, for example, under 
that situation? That’s why we need to keep these four 
possible outcomes in mind. And that’s really just the 
starting point when you’re thinking about evidence 
policy.189 
 
Professor Pardo’s observation that evidence must produce acceptable 
and useful rates of true positives and true negatives while not producing 
unacceptable rates of false positives or false negatives raises the important 
question of what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable rates of accurate 
and erroneous results. This is a mixed empirical and normative question. 
The empirical dimension asks: how good is the test?190 The normative 
dimension asks: what is our tolerance for error, and for different kinds of 
errors in different legal and social contexts?191  
The following example illustrates the combined empirical and 
normative dimensions of whether to admit a new diagnostic test into 
evidence. Imagine a test that somehow detects actual innocence amongst a 
population of incarcerated individuals. The test is 100 percent accurate in 
detecting wrongfully convicted persons, detecting every single person who 
was actually wrongfully convicted. But it also produces false positives: for 
every actually wrongfully convicted person it detects, it also identifies one 
other person as wrongfully convicted who is in fact guilty. Thus for every 
two people the test identifies as innocent, there is only a 50-50 chance that 
either individual is innocent. The question about whether to rely on such a 
test is essentially a normative one: because of the importance of not 
depriving an innocent person of his or her liberty and the horror we might 
feel at incarcerating an innocent person, we might tolerate this 50-50 
 
 189. See Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Shen, supra note 187, at 664 (explaining how 
the role of neuroscience has helped with assessing pain, suffering, and damages in litigation and 
how the data has, in some instances, had a material effect on case outcomes). 
 190. See Frederick Shauer, Can Bad Science be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, 
and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1205 (2010) (acknowledging how evidence reliability 
and admissibility depends on the purposes of which the evidence is being used). 
 191. Id. 
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relationship between true and false positives. In the converse situation, 
where a test might result in the deprivation of liberty instead, we ought not 
to tolerate such a ratio. These normative and policy questions overlay the 
empirical questions, and likely vary between civil and criminal contexts as 
well as among the varied civil and administrative contexts.192 
Professor Pardo commented that discussions about evidence tend to 
focus on individual determinations to admit particular evidence, but 
cautions that it is important to be mindful of the system level implications 
of whether certain evidence is admitted.193 He noted that “allow[ing] 
certain kinds of evidence in” may result in “deterring or encouraging certain 
kinds of claims” in future cases.194 Those future claims “may be true claims 
or they may be false claims.”195 Thus, evidentiary determinations can affect 
the pool of cases that come into the system. Further, decisions to admit or 
exclude certain evidence can “affect[] the way you create evidence for the 
next case. One reason to exclude evidence might be to get better quality 
evidence for the next set of cases, which is a relevant policy 
consideration.”196 Professor Pardo tied these remarks to Professor Greely’s 
earlier comments about the development of a research culture around DNA 
testing and evidence as well as the important effects of the 
professionalization of DNA testing relative to other forensic sciences.197  
Evidentiary determinations to admit or exclude certain kinds of 
evidence also affects “primary behavior”—that is, how people and entities 
 
 192. See generally Frederick Schauer, Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence 
1, 7 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 2012-49, 
2012) (explaining how the use or non-use of science in the legal system involves normative 
questions in various contexts). 
 193. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Pardo, supra note 188, at 568 (noting that a theory of 
evidence and proof must provide or rely upon a plausible explanation of how the micro- and 
macro-levels fit together); Jay D. Aronson, The Law’s Use of Brain Evidence, 6 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 93, 99–100 (2010) (explaining how many hypotheses are based on limited studies, and 
how more work needs to be done before evidence can be ready for use in the legal system). 
 194. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, 
Using Brain Imaging For Lie Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 222, 224 (noting that emerging and recurring patterns of evidence may have 
future impacts on situations that have significant legal consequences). 
 195. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Henry T. Greely, Remarks at the Regan Lecture: 
Neuroethics: The Neuroscience Revolution, Ethics, and the Law (Apr. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/greely/neuroscience_ethics_law.html 
(remarking how neuroscience may make different kinds of predictions about people and how 
claims can vary enormously, suggesting that these future claims may be either true or false). 
 196. See Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12 (explaining how neuroscience evidence methods may 
have substantial effects on almost every trial and on the entire judicial system). 
 197. Id.; see also Hon. Andre Davis, Karen D. Davis, & Hank Greely, Imaging the Brain, 
Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 1: Legal and 
Neuroscientific Perspectives on Chronic Pain 26 (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 1] (transcript 
on file with the editors). 
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act outside of court, Professor Pardo explained.198 Evidentiary regimes 
affect how likely a party is to be subject to a lawsuit, which then might 
deter a party from certain conduct.199 Then, we have to ask, “[i]s that 
conduct [that is being deterred] good conduct or bad conduct, socially good 
or socially bad?”200 In summary, Professor Pardo noted that in considering 
whether new, brain based evidence on chronic pain should be admissible, 
we need to consider the four kinds of results we might get, the effects on 
the next set of cases, and the effects on primary behavior.201 
These kinds of evidence policy questions also intersect with how 
judges, jurors, and others interpret and make sense of evidence. “The 
significance of evidence isn’t something that comes stamped on the 
evidence. Evidence isn’t self-defining,” Professor Pardo explained.202 
Instead, the beliefs of jurors and judges (or whoever the decision maker is) 
“are a necessary part of the process.”203 Professor Pardo asserted that 
evidence must go well beyond the rules or any particular admit-or-exclude 
decision.204 It extends to how legal decision makers (judges, jurors, and 
administrative personnel) think about claims, claimants, and kinds of proof 
in order to reach their decisions.205 A basic aspect of how the legal system 
works involves the process in which the fact finder’s “knowledge, beliefs, 
 
 198. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Pardo, supra note 188, at 554–55 (explaining the 
practical significance of evidence theory and how it extends well beyond trials); Jane Campbell 
Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 
760 (2009) (describing how the field of neuroscience is developing outside of the courtroom in 
multiple settings). 
 199. See Pardo, supra note 188, at 554 (“[T]he evidentiary rules and standards also determine 
important issues such as who gets to trial in the first place, which verdicts will be allowed to 
stand, and which convictions will be overturned.”). 
 200. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.; see also Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal 
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 322 (2006) (explaining how neuroscience tests arguably are 
qualitatively different since they compel inductive evidence of mental events, beliefs, thoughts, 
and propositional knowledge); Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the 
United States, INT’L NEUROLAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349, 357 (2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2001085 (noting that new brain imaging and 
brain monitoring technologies have created problems for judges, jurors, and the like regarding the 
admissibility and proper interpretation of evidence). 
 203. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Amanda C. Pustilnik, Painful Disparities, Painful 
Realties 6 (Univ. of Md. Francis King Carey Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-
18, 2014), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2449&context=fac_pubs 
(stating that judges and jurors frequently need to evaluate evidence of chronic pain); Jones & 
Shen, supra note 202, at 353 (acknowledging that the justice system relies critically and 
fundamentally on the judges, jurors, lawyers, etc.). 
 204. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 20. 
 205. Id. at 12; see also supra text accompanying note 203. 
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[and] assumptions will combine with the trial evidence.”206 It is this 
combination of evidence with the decision makers’ background knowledge 
and beliefs that result in the decision makers’ “reach[ing] particular 
conclusions [and] draw[ing] particular inferences. Without these 
background beliefs, the evidence goes nowhere.”207  
The legal system’s reliance on the background beliefs and knowledge 
of decision makers can be beneficial. But in areas where decision makers 
are poorly informed or tend to hold mistaken beliefs, it also can lead to 
predictable and intractable problems. In “turning to the question of juror 
beliefs or juror assumptions about chronic pain and about objective, 
scientific evidence on chronic pain,” Professor Pardo stated that he sees “a 
potential opportunity and a potential analogy with what is called ‘social 
framework evidence.’”208  
Social framework evidence comes into a trial in 
 
situations where experts are called upon to summarize 
phenomena for the jury that might be inconsistent with 
their mistaken background beliefs. Potential categories for 
this in the social science context could include: eyewitness 
identification, such as when, as a general matter, are 
eyewitnesses likely to make mistakes; false confessions, 
where jurors may believe it is not possible that anyone who 
is innocent would confess to a crime, but we know there are 
lots of situations in which that might occur—giving the 
jury background information like that could be helpful; 
issues about gender and racial bias in employment cases is 
 
 206. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Owen D. Jones, Seven Ways Neuroscience Aids Law, 
in NEUROSCIENCES AND THE HUMAN PERSON: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN ACTIVITIES 1, 8 
(2013), available at http://www.casinapioiv.va/content/dam/accademia/pdf/sv121/sv121-jones.pdf 
(“[T]he legal system’s frequent dependence—typically without knowing it—on what are, at base, 
neuroscientific assumptions.”). 
 207. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12; see also Shauer, supra note 190, at 1208–09 (explaining how 
slight or even weak evidence may often aid in a holistic creation form, or for the related purpose 
of creating an inference as to the best explanation). 
 208. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12–13. “Social framework evidence” is a term first coined by the 
legal scholars, John Monahan and Laurens Walker, in their article: Social Frameworks: A New 
Use of Social Science in the Law. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New 
Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 576 (1987). The proper scope and limits of 
social framework evidence remain hotly debated by evidence scholars, in part because of 
questions about the validity and rigor of some of the social science research in which social 
framework evidence may be based. See id. (noting that aggregate evidentiary information is likely 
highly undervalued by law decision makers).  
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another popular example with regard to social framework 
evidence.209 
 
Expanding on this practice of social framework evidence in these 
areas, there could be  
 
something similar in this context, call it “neuroscientific 
framework evidence,” where you can have an expert who 
can come in and educate the jury about basic background 
assumptions that might be mistaken, such as the fact that 
chronic pain does exist, and that at least for some people, 
they experience this phenomenon without having certain 
kinds of visible physical markers like a missing limb.210  
 
In considering whether neuroscientific framework evidence would be 
valuable, Professor Pardo commented that if one party were to make the 
strong argument that a certain “kind of chronic pain symptom simply does 
not exist,” and therefore the claimant should be believed, that would 
“make[] the case for admissibility [of educative evidence] a lot higher.”211 
Another important evaluation that Professor Pardo pointed out consists 
of the comparison between a party’s claim and the judges’ or jurors’ 
“background beliefs and assumptions” that may be mistaken, but on which 
the system relies.212 A significant gap between a decision maker’s 
knowledge and beliefs and the (possibly meritorious) claims by a party also 
present a context in which an expert could provide educational or 
framework evidence.213 If a party seeks to “correct those [mistaken beliefs 
or assumptions], that’s one potential avenue for admitting expert testimony 
 
 209. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 12–13; see also Walker & Monahan, supra note 208, at 565 
(explaining how social science may encapsulate ordinary human experiences and provide 
appropriate frames of reference with respect to a jury’s consideration). 
 210. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 13. “[E]xpert scientific testimony must present information that 
is outside the ‘common knowledge’ of the average layperson. These rules suggest that empirical 
frameworks must provide fact finders with information they do not already have.” Walker & 
Monahan, supra note 208, at 578.  
 211. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 13; see also Walker & Monahan, supra note 208, at 572 
(explaining how the framework that makes any fact in the case more or less probable poses a 
difficult issue rather than a concrete probability). 
 212. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 13. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of 
Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 189 n. 193 (2006) (illustrating the willingness of judges, 
even more so than juries, to convict in criminal cases based on their beliefs about the defendant 
and beyond what was presented as evidence in the trial). 
 213. See David Jaroslaw & Wendy Michael, The Expert Witness as Teacher: How a “Neutral” 
Tutorial Can Enhance a Jury’s Understanding of Your Case, 62 FDCC QUARTERLY 156, 156 
(2012) (describing how expert witnesses can educate juries and judges on unfamiliar subjects so 
that the lawyer can then persuade them with the facts of the case). 
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on this topic.”214 If framework evidence about the neuroscience of chronic 
pain were to be admitted on this basis, Professor Pardo suggested that it 
would first be important to gather data on “what it is that judges and juries 
don’t understand” in relation to the evidence and the claims that they are 
being called upon to evaluate.215 
Formal rules of evidence, judicially created case law concerning 
evidence, and statutes and regulations can also significantly affect the 
weight and power of certain kinds of evidence, Professor Pardo 
explained.216 As a matter of law, certain evidence can “create a 
presumption” in one direction or another.217 Some presumptions are 
rebuttable, meaning that the party against whom the presumption is drawn 
can come forward with evidence that overcomes the presumption.218 Other 
presumptions are “irrebuttable,” meaning that the party cannot overcome 
the presumption; if certain evidence is present, jurors must reach one, and 
only one conclusion.219 Other strictures also may constrain the purposes for 
 
 214. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. See also Edmund S. Higgins & Bruce S. Skinner, 
Establishing the Relevance of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification: Comparing 
Forty Recent Cases with the Psychological Studies, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 471, 472–73, 481 (2003) 
(suggesting that using expert testimony about the fallibility of eyewitness recall would help 
correct jurors’ inaccurate assumptions, decreasing the number of wrongful convictions). 
 215. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 14. 
 216. Id. at 20–22 (describing examples of cases such as Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), statutes such as the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety 
Act, and different presumptions from the legal rules of evidence that could impact the way pain 
evidence is handled in future cases). 
 217. See, e.g., David Kaiser, Presumptions of Law and of Fact, 38, MARQ. L. REV. 253, 255, 
(1955) (describing how evidence that someone has been missing for seven years without making 
contact with anyone can be used to presume that, for legal purposes, the missing person is dead). 
 218. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining "rebuttable presumption”). To 
illustrate: one ancient common law presumption is that people intend the natural and probable 
consequences of their actions. See Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences 
Doctrine: A Case Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388, 395 (2010) 
(defining the doctrine and showing how some presumptions can be challenged and ultimately 
overturned). An additional example: if a person hurls a baseball at the window of a house, jurors 
may presume that she intended to break the window. This is a “rebuttable presumption,” however, 
and may be overcome if the party provides compelling evidence that she did not intend to hurl the 
ball or that she had an alternative reason for so acting, e.g., the owner of the house invited her to 
play ball against the new, unbreakable glass he installed. 
 219. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining "conclusive presumption,” 
which is also known as an irrebuttable presumption). A common irrebuttable presumption relates 
to intoxication. By statute, a person whose blood alcohol level exceeds the legal limit for the 
jurisdiction is presumed to be drunk. Jurors presented with evidence that a driver’s blood alcohol 
was over the legal limit cannot decide among themselves based on other evidence that the driver 
had a higher tolerance; as a matter of law, that driver was drunk. See State v. Childress, 274 P.2d 
333, 335 (Ariz. 1954) (holding that a blood alcohol level that exceeds the legal limit conclusively 
proves that the driver was intoxicated, thus creating an irrebuttable presumption). See The 
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974) 
(discussing a series of opinions in which the Supreme Court has developed a doctrine dealing with 
“irrebuttable presumptions”). 
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which jurors may consider the evidence.220 Jurors may be able to consider 
certain evidence for one purpose but not for another.221 Similarly, an expert 
providing framework evidence may be limited in his or her testimony in 
providing information about research findings and data on the subject in 
question, but may not opine about the ultimate issues in the case.222 
This range of presumptions, restrictions, and guidelines could apply to 
neuroimaging based testimony and evidence as well. “At the strongest 
level,” Professor Pardo commented, “we could say having this kind of 
objective evidence (say, neuroimaging or anything else) is so good that 
we’re going to create an irrebuttable presumption, that if you have this kind 
of objective evidence, you win.”223 Certain federal regulations provide 
precedent for treating medical or scientific evidence this way.224 Professor 
Pardo described the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, which “says 
that if you have clinical evidence of certain kinds of lung disease, you are 
irrebuttably presumed to be disabled. There’s no further fact finding that 
 
 220. See infra text accompanying notes 221–22. 
 221. See Michael H. Graham & Robert S. Glazier, Subsequent Remedial Measures: The 
Misunderstood Rule of Evidence, LXXII FLA. B.J. 40 (1998) (noting that this evidence can be 
submitted, but only if it is considered for certain purposes). For example: in tort law, if a plaintiff 
claims to have been injured on some allegedly negligently maintained property, the plaintiff can 
admit evidence that the property owner made repairs to the property after the accident. Jurors may 
consider this evidence for various purposes, such as whether the owner had control over the 
property or whether repairs were feasible. But, as a matter of law, they may not consider the fact 
of the subsequent repair to infer that the property was dangerous and negligently maintained prior 
to the repair.  
 222. See FED. R. EVID. 704 (stating that experts may provide their opinions on the ultimate 
issue in the case except when the expert is testifying about the mental state of a defendant in a 
criminal case, where only the trier of fact may decide the “ultimate issue” of whether the person 
did or did not have the required mental state to commit the crime). 
 223. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 20. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (describing 
the tort concept of res ipsa loquitor, which is Latin for “the thing speaks for itself”). Res ipsa 
loquitur is a rebuttable presumption, in the sense that if the defendant can prove that the object 
was in fact not under his control, then he was not negligent. See Maroules v. Jumbo, Inc., 452 F.3d 
639, 8–12 (2006) (explaining the different ways both parties could try to support or disprove a 
claim of control in a res ipsa locator case). However, there has been a lot of push back on 
scientific evidence being used as an irrebuttable presumption of guilt in litigation. See Stephen G. 
Thompson, The Constitutionality of Chemical Test Presumptions of Intoxication in Motor Vehicle 
Statutes, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 301, 302–04 (1983) (expressing concern that cases that rely on 
breath testing of blood alcohol levels to convict drunk drivers if they are over a statutorily 
determined limit is a violation of due process); see also Brie S. Rogers, The Presumption of 
Paternity in Child Support Cases: A Triumph of Law Over Biology, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1151 
(2002) (noting that in family law cases, there is a legal presumption for the husband of his wife’s 
child to legally be the father, even if the biological DNA evidence conclusively demonstrates that 
he is not the biologically the father). 
 224. See, e.g., Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No 91-173, 83 Stat. 
742 (creating certain irrebuttable presumptions relating to coal miners who are diagnosed with 
black lung disease). 
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has to occur—having this evidence means you get benefits.”225 Similarly, 
“if your blood alcohol level is above a certain level, you are presumed 
irrebuttably to be drunk. You don’t get to come to court and say, ‘well, my 
tolerance is higher.’” If neuroimaging evidence of chronic pain were to 
become sufficiently diagnostically accurate, we could have something 
similar if we have really good evidence of chronic pain.226  
 
Less strong than actual regulation, however, we could still 
have a kind of presumption that’s rebuttable but that’s 
mandatory. That says that, if you have this evidence, we’re 
going to presume that you have chronic pain, and it’s up to 
the other side either to disprove it, or to introduce some 
evidence on that issue. If not, then you win as a matter of 
law.227 We could have a non-mandatory, sort of permissive 
presumption . . . . It’s just a standardized comment on the 
evidence, or an instruction to the jury telling them, “if you 
find that there is this evidence and you find it credible, you 
may infer pain [just] from this evidence alone. You don’t 
have to, but you may.” . . . So there [are] a whole [set] of 
regulation[s] or options available to the law in regulating 
what we do with this evidence beyond just the admitted or 
excluded.228 
 
Professor Robert Dinerstein commented on Professor Pardo’s remarks, 
observing that presumptions and other evidentiary rules “are not necessarily 
rules of science” or even rules that incorporate scientific findings.229 
Instead, evidentiary rules, presumptions, and features of regulations (as 
with the Federal Coal Miner’s Act) may embody both normative and policy 
 
 225. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 21; see also Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 § 
411(c)(3). 
 226. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 19. But see Thompson, supra note 223 (raising constitutional 
concerns, in light of recent Supreme Court cases, that these types of presumptions violate due 
process). 
 227. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 19. See also Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 317 (1985) 
(describing a mandatory rebuttable presumption and the resulting burden shifting between 
parties). 
 228. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 20. See Peter Widulski, NY Court of Appeals Addresses Another 
Statutory Presumption, PACE CRIM. JUST. BLOG, (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://pcjc.blogs.law.pace.edu/2014/10/28/ny-court-of-appeals-addresses-another-statutory-
presumption/ (describing jury instructions for a permissive presumption). 
 229. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 19. See Joseph T. Walsh, The Evolving Standards of 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 36 JUDGES’ J. 33 (1997) (illuminating the tensions between 
the increased amount of scientific evidence available and legal procedure). 
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considerations.230 An important policy consideration that can influence 
rules and regulations is the question of “how much is it worth . . . [to] spend 
the time it would take . . . trying to do some fact finding,” versus the 
question of whether it is more efficient to “just presume” in one direction or 
another when certain facts are present.231  
 
 
 230. See infra text accompanying note 231. 
 231. Panel 2, supra note 1, at 20. 
